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Can Board Diversity and Choice of Auditor Enhance 
Profitability? 
 
 
Abstract 
The research examines how board diversity and choice of auditing firm, as mechanisms of 
corporate governance, affect the profitability of Iberian companies. Using information from an 
adjusted sample of 93 non-financial companies listed on the Iberian stock exchanges, a 
theoretical model was regressed. Profit Margin (PM) and Return on Equity (ROE), as two of 
the more frequently used profitability measures, capture, at a moderately acceptable level, the 
impact derived from board diversity and choice of auditing firm among Iberian companies. 
Most variables cited are not equally distributed across Iberia, in line with Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions model. The evidence, while inconclusive, provides valuable insight into how 
governance mechanisms affect performance. In addition, the research provides value to the 
literature by introducing new proxies on board characteristics, and its impact on dynamic 
profitability. 
 
Keywords: board diversity; auditing firms; profitability; assets turnover; Iberia; Portugal; 
Spain  
 
 
  
1. Introduction and research objective 
The research around Corporate Governance (CG) has developed over the last decades, largely 
by adopting two basic assumptions: first, that the orientation of companies is managed towards 
performance, efficiency, growth, with efficient structures built on transparent relations with 
stakeholders; and second, that management is focused on rules and regulations that influence 
corporate activity (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Coles et al. 2001; Dahya and McConnell 2007; 
Vintila and Gherghina 2012; Shank et al. 2013; Yaacob and Basiuni 2014; Mishra and Mohanty 
2014; Mouselli et al. 2014; BIS 2010, 2014; Klettner et al. 2014; OECD 2015). As a driver of 
performance and profitability (Sachdeva 2014; Mizutani and Nakamura 2012), CG relates to 
how risk between ownership, management, and control, can be mitigated (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Ahrens and Khalifa 2013). Good corporate governance practices can curb failure due to 
fraudulent activity, collusion, and mismanagement (Yaacob and Basiuni 2014) as well as 
driving sustainability (Lattemann 2014). 
 
Broadly, CG is the framework within which companies conduct their business and by which 
they are controlled. It encompasses guidelines for best practice (Cadbury 1992; Higgs 2003), 
which sets out the relationship between management, the board, shareholders, and 
stakeholders; specifically, the rights, roles, and responsibilities of all personnel to establish 
how authority and responsibility are allocated and how decisions are taken (BIS 2015; OECD 
2015). More precisely, corporate governance assures stakeholders in a company return on 
investment (ROI) (Klettner et al. 2014; Mishra and Mohanty 2014; Mouselli et al. 2014). This 
framework, separating ownership and management, usually means that investors benefit from 
good corporate governance mechanisms. Company stockholders elect directors, and they have 
the power to appoint and supervise management (FRC 2011; Pierce 2012). Sometimes conflict 
between management and shareholders arises due to contradictory personal financial interests, 
which can affect company performance. This, the result of an asymmetry of information, is 
usually due to managers having access to more information than shareholders (Gjesdal 2007), 
although Almazan et al. (2008) suggest that independent investment advisors and managers of 
investment companies that are in a position to monitor management are at an advantage. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) refer to this as agency costs, when the performance of a company is hindered 
by internal conflicts between the principal and the agent. Other research in this field has shown 
a stronger relationship between financial performance and board governance. Most of the 
research on elements of the board, i.e. independence, composition, frequency of meetings and 
board size, and gender and ethnic diversity, has focused on United States companies (Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Nicholson and Kiel 
2007; Carter et al. 2010; Boulouta 2013). Carter et al. (2010) argue that there is no significant 
relationship between the financial performance of major US companies, and ethnic and gender 
diversity on boards. Erhardt et al. (2003) measured diversity by the percentage of minorities 
(e.g. women) on the boards of 127 US companies and concluded that board diversity positively 
correlates with company performance indicators. On the other hand, empirical evidence from 
India demonstrates that a large number of independent directors have a negative impact on 
company performance, in contrast to board size, which positively correlates with performance 
(Chugh et al. 2011). Corporate governance is also instrumental in the way a company sets out 
its objectives, the mechanisms for maintenance of those objectives, and how it supervises 
performance (OECD 2015). 
 
Empirical research demonstrates that companies with inefficient CG tend to deliver inferior 
returns to shareholders (Von Nandelstadh and Rosenberg 2003). Bhagat and Black (2008) 
advocate that boards can improve performance by increasing sensitivity to risk and embedding 
risk-aversion into organisational processes (Yaacob and Basiuni 2014). Effective CG deals not 
only with assuring ROI for investors (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Lopes and Ferraz 2016), but 
also creates a system that directs and controls companies (Sheikh et al. 2013). 
 
The aim of the current research is to identify whether board diversity and the type of auditing 
firm the company chooses can be used as predictors of company performance. It looks at 
whether CG indicators, i.e. board size and composition, the number of women, proportion of 
non-executive members, and members participating in other internal and external committees, 
differ between Portugal and Spain. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1.Governance and diversity on boards 
The board of directors (BoD) usually has a dual function of monitoring/controlling and takes a 
consultative role within management (Jensen 1993). Various theories support each of the 
board’s functions: Daily et al. (2003) show how the monitoring/controlling role is accentuated 
by agency theory, while the consultative role is emphasised by resource dependence theory 
(Zahra and Pearce 1989; Johnson et al. 1996; Daily et al. 2003). Both theories suggest that 
certain board characteristics can affect the monitoring and advisory role of it (Rodriguez-
Fernandez et al. 2013; Bianco et al. 2015), and hence affect performance. Agency theory 
stresses how the segregation of management from ownership leads to self-centred behaviour 
by managers and information asymmetry (Gjesdal 2007), increasing agency costs as well as 
conflicts within the company. Research has found that in order to reduce agency costs and 
assure effective control and monitoring, board members are chosen as an internal ruling body 
(Park and Shin 2004) to define the objectives of the company and monitor its performance (BIS 
2015), although monitoring is not restricted to financial measures (Galbreath 2012). 
Consequently, the board is responsible for applying effective corporate governance practices 
and is liable for the functioning, financial performance, and effective allocation of authority 
and responsibility within the company (BIS 2015). In addition, international portfolio 
investments incentivise good corporate governance practices worldwide (Aggarwal et al. 
2011), with institutional investors playing a role in monitoring management (Almazan et al. 
2008), although action to apply efficacious practices may depend on board characteristics 
(Bozec 2005; Dahya et al. 2009). Diversity on boards is defined by a number of characteristics 
(Lopes and Ferraz 2016); the requirement to disclose non-financial information (European 
Parliament and the Council 2014; OECD 2015) includes reporting on board diversity and 
policy. In the current research, analyses of facets of the board include gender diversity, size, 
proportion of non-nationals, background of its members, and interlocking directors. In order to 
test the relationship between board diversity and company performance the following 
hypotheses have been formulated: 
• Gender diversity: previous studies that considered gender and ethnic diversity to have 
the same impact on company performance have merged the two characteristics into the 
same variable. Here, the suggestion of Carter et al. (2010), who find significant 
differences between ethnic-minority directors and women directors, based on human 
capital theory, is followed, and the gender difference of the board indicates the 
proportion of women out of the total number of directors. Gender studies worldwide 
link women with qualities such as empathy, affection, and promotion of community 
values (Eagly et al. 1995; Boulouta 2013), hence they suggest that women can 
indirectly improve company performance. Consistent with this logic, several studies 
pose that female board members boost company returns (Erhardt et al. 2003; Francoeur 
et al. 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009). Other research finds that gender diversity 
negatively affects performance (Shrader and Blackburn 1997); and some report no 
impact at all or show inconclusive results (Daily et al. 1999; Carter et al. 2003; Adams 
et al. 2009). 
• Board size: here, this represents the number of directors on the board. According to 
Limpton and Jay (1992), limiting board size to seven or eight members results in better 
co-ordination, communication, and compliance in decision-making, hence increasing 
board performance. Taking a similar line, Jensen (1993) states that smaller boards can 
boost company performance, because there is likely to be wider participation by all 
members in the monitoring and evaluation process of management. However, other 
studies based on resource dependence theory argue that larger boards have greater 
collective information in their possession, leading to better performance (Zahra and 
Pearce 1989; Guest 2009). Another advantage of larger board size is seen in greater 
support to management through better counselling, as the larger the board the more 
likely it is to have members from diverse industry sectors and backgrounds to offer 
expertise (Dalton et al. 1999). 
• Auditor: auditing provides a control and bonding mechanism to minimise the agency 
costs provoked by asymmetric information between parties (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Here, the company’s choice of auditing firm has 
been considered as a board characteristic; more specifically, whether the board has 
contracted one of the Big 4 to act as auditor. Based on the Taiwanese market, Lee and 
Lee (2013) showed that equity book value and earnings audited by one of the Big 4 
firms tended to justify more comprehensively the variations in stock returns than other 
firms of auditors. Lee and Lee’s results fall in favour of the Big 4 due to their financial 
reporting, which allows the value of the company to be ascertained and, therefore, more 
accurately project the future value of the company. 
• Board composition: here, board composition refers to the diversity of nationalities on 
the board, hence the number of non-nationals sitting on it. Other researchers have 
analysed the impact of foreign directors on boards in relation to company performance. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), in accordance with resource dependence theory, confirm 
that participation of foreign directors on boards improves company performance. This 
is due not only to their experience in foreign markets but also enhanced cultural 
knowledge, particularly as non-nationals on boards is shown to increase the networking 
capacity and the international exposure of the company. Contrary evidence from 
Switzerland shows that a high number of diverse nationalities on boards can complicate 
integration and impede communication among board members, and that his leads to 
conflict, which can affect the decision-making processes of the board and its 
performance (Ruigrok et al. 2007). In general, empirical studies show a positive 
relationship between company performance and “non-national” directors. Evidence 
from the Korean market also confirms that international diversity among board 
members positively effects performance (Choi et al. 2007). 
• Interlocking directorate: is a common phenomenon that arises when one or more board 
members sits on the board of another company (Mizruchi 1996); here, measured as the 
ratio of board members who sit on external boards. It has been reported that publicly 
traded companies disclosed relevant enhancement in operating performance when at 
least three outside directors were appointed to the board (Dahya and McConnell 2007). 
Brickley and James (1987) noted that a relevant number of external directors tended 
towards better control and lowered management benefits and perks. Conversely, a US-
focused study showed a negative relationship between company performance and 
outside directors (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). In addition, it has been observed that a 
high number of outside directors on the board negatively influence company 
performance in terms of the price‒earnings ratio, the return on assets (Ehikioya 2009), 
and added market value (Coles et al. 2001). Nevertheless, many other studies report 
inconclusive results of the link between company performance and the number of 
outside directors (Mehran 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Bhagat and Black 
2008). Evidence from the South Korean market also found no correlation between the 
aforementioned variables (Black et al. 2006). 
 
Overall, the literature supports the connection between good corporate governance 
mechanisms and positive company performance and profitability (Klettner et al. 2014; Shank 
et al. 2013; Mishra and Mohanty 2014; Mouselli et al. 2014). Investors usually prefer to deal 
with companies with better governance practices, which can raise funds for investment at lower 
cost, and thereby strengthen financial performance and profitability. On the other hand, 
governance practices also have a significant impact on regulatory bodies in their efforts to 
enhance the quality of corporate reporting. 
 
2.2.National cultural dimensions 
Differences between countries are usually based on Hofstede’s cultural model (Hofstede et al. 
2010). Here it is argued that these differences have four dimensions: “power distance”, 
avoidance of uncertainty, individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity versus 
femininity, adding subsequently two further dimensions: long-term versus short-term 
orientation and indulgence. Power distance expresses the extent to which less powerful 
members of an organisation accept that power is unequally distributed, while avoidance of 
uncertainty embodies the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous situations and 
create beliefs and institutions in an attempt to avoid them. The fundamental issue is how society 
deals with the fact that the future cannot be known. Individualism embodies the degree to which 
individuals are integrated into groups. Masculinity, on the other hand, refers to the distribution 
of emotional attributes between the genders, which is another fundamental issue for any society 
where a range of solutions are sought; and long-term orientation promotes pragmatic virtues 
oriented towards future rewards, in particular thrift, persistence, and adapting to change. 
Finally, indulgence distinguishes a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and 
natural human drives related to leisure. Restraint indicates a society that suppresses the 
gratification of need, and regulates it, by means of strict social norms. Portugal and Spain are 
characterised by strong uncertainty avoidance and power distance. However, differences 
among the dimensions can be observed, specifically in terms of individualism, masculinity, 
long-term orientation, and indulgence (Hofstede 2010). These four dimensions are stronger in 
Spain than they are in Portugal, probably also reflecting the scale effects. Thus, complementary 
to the research of Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. (2013), the objective of the current approach is 
to identify and underline the convergent and divergent issues that mark the contrast between 
Portugal and Spain in relation to both board diversity and choice of auditing firm, and the 
impact of these on company performance and profitability.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1.Data and sample selection 
The data on which the current paper is based has been extracted from publicly listed companies 
on the Portuguese and Spanish stock markets (180 companies). Companies operating in the 
financial industry were excluded from the data set, because they undergo different governance 
regulations compared to other companies (Klein 1998). Furthermore, this research does not 
include companies with different taxation periods (reference: civil year) or companies with 
missing values. Data relevant to the attributes of the independent variables were taken from the 
2013 annual corporate governance reports of selected companies, while the data relating to 
company profitability measures were extracted from DataStream for the financial year 2014. 
After excluding these companies, a sample of 97 companies (including potential outliers) was 
fixed in the preliminary empirical step. 
 
As mentioned, this research aims to analyse the effect of board diversity and choice of auditor 
on company profitability. Thus, while other research has used several accounting-based 
measures in order to analyse the same impact (i.e. Profit Margin, Asset Turnover, Return on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Earnings Per Share (EPS), Price Earnings Ratio (P-
E), Pay-out Ratio, among others (Zahra and Pearce 1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Von 
Nandelstadh and Rosenberg 2003; Bhagat and Black 2008; Guest 2009; Sachdeva 2014; 
Mizutani and Nakamura 2012; Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. 2013; Klettner et al. 2014; Mishra 
and Mohanty 2014; Mouselli et al. 2014; Bianco et al. 2015; Lopes and Ferraz, 2016), the 
current research selects only three of them (Profit Margin, Return on Equity, and Asset 
Turnover) as suggested by Weygandt et al. (2012). Independent variables were identified and 
selected from the relevant literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1983; 
Limpton and Jay 1992; Eagle et al. 1995; Shrader and Blackburn 1997; Coles et al. 2001; 
Jensen 1993; Oxlheim and Randoy 2003; Bozec 2005; Dahya et al. 2009; Carter et al. 2010; 
Boulouta 2013; Lee and Lee 2013; Lopes and Ferraz 2016). The variable Size (measured as 
the logarithm of total assets) and Leverage (measured as total debts to total assets) of the 
selected firms were entered into the model as control variables. A positive signal is expected 
for the variable SIZE while a negative signal is predicted for the variable LEV. Hence, the 
theoretical construct is based on the variables identified in Table 1 below. 
 
  
Table 1 ‒ Description and framework of variables 
VARIABLE 
TYPOLOGY VAR. DESCRIPTION 
DEPENDENT 
(Yit) 
PMit 
Profit Margin (Net Income/Net Sales): 
measures net income generated by each 
currency unit of sales. 
ATURit 
Asset Turnover (Net Sales/Average 
Assets): measures how efficiently assets 
are used to generate sales. 
ROAit 
Return on Equity (Net Income/Average 
Ordinary Equity): measures profitability 
of shareholders’ investment. 
INDEPENDENT 
(Xit) 
BDSIZEit Number of members sitting on the BoD 
BDWOMit Proportion of women on the BoD 
BDINDit Proportion of independent members on the BoD 
BDNON-
NATii 
Proportion of foreigners (non-nationals) 
on the BoD 
BDAGEit Average age of board members  
BDEXTit 
Proportion of members sitting on external 
boards 
BDEXECii  Proportion of executive members on the BoD 
AUDit 
Auditing company hired (1 if audited by 
one of the Big 4 firms, 0 otherwise) 
COUNTit 
Company listed on the Portuguese or 
Spanish stock exchange (1 if a 
Portuguese company, 0 if a Spanish 
company) 
CONTROL 
(Xit) 
SIZEit Logarithm of total assets 
LEVit Total book debts to total assets ratio 
 
 
 Based on the variables identified, it is expected that board characteristics, the type of auditing 
firm chosen, leverage, and size of the firm can all act as good indicators of a firm’s profitability. 
Thus, the general theoretical equation can be structured as follows: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1BDSIZEit + β2BDWOMit + β3BDINDit + β4BDNON-NATit + β5BDAGEit + 
β6BDEXTit + β7BDEXECit +β8AUDit + β9COUNTit + β10SIZEit + Β11LEVit + εit 
(i = 1,….,n ; t = 1,….,m) 
 
Before conducting the empirical analysis, it was necessary to ensure that the available sample 
was eligible for application of a multiple regression (Cohen et al. 2003). The Durbin-Watson 
statistic assured the independence of observations, evidencing that no correlation exists in the 
research sample. It was confirmed that the residuals are normally distributed and that they fit 
the normal distribution line. The data has also been tested for homoscedasticity to ensure that 
the variances remain similar when moving along the line of residuals. In addition, further 
checks were made, to ensure that the independent variables are not highly correlated with each 
other, and this is verifiable by observing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. Being that 
the independent variables have a VIF value of between 1.069 and 2.903 (not close to 10), we 
can conclude that there is no multicollinearity. Finally, three other tools were used to eliminate 
significant outliers, high leverage and influential points, which could otherwise reduce the 
significance and the predictive accuracy of the model. The respective measures were set as 
follows: Mahalanobis Distance < 16.919; Centred Leverage Value < 0.295; Cook’s Distance < 
1. After eliminating all of the outliers and running the necessary tests, a final adjusted sample 
of 93 companies (Portugal 35; Spain 58) was available for the empirical model. 
 
4. Results and Interpretation 
 4.1. Descriptive and correlation measures 
Companies used for the purposes of this study operated in nine different business sectors. The 
Industrials sector represents 25.3% of the total sample, including transportation, electronic, 
aerospace and defence, construction and materials, electronics and electrical equipment. 
Consumer Goods represents 19.8% of the sample, including food and beverage producers, 
leisure goods, tobacco, home construction, and automobiles. With regard to the AUD variable, 
84.9% of companies contracted one of the Big 4 auditing firms, with only 14 (15.1%) audited 
by a non-Big 4 firm. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2, below. 
 Table 2 – Descriptive Measures 
Variable N  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
PM 93  -1.588 0.570 0.023 0.212 -4.816 36.776 
ATUR 93  0.089 2.724 0.740 0.455 1.650 4.837 
ROE 93  -0.706 0.223 0.010 0.109 -3.872 22.586 
BDSIZE 93  5 23 11.323 3.930 0.740 0.309 
BDWOM 93  0.000 0.364 0.114 0.106 0.639 -0.563 
BDIND 93  0.000 0.889 0.368 0.193 0.228 -0.144 
BDNON-NAT 93  0.000 1.000 0.179 0.230 1.460 1.720 
BDAGE 93  47.313 66.286 58.116 4.130 -0.182 0.058 
BDEXT 93  0.222 1.000 0.708 0.167 -0.085 -0.234 
BDEXEC 93  0.000 0.875 0.274 0.170 1.058 1.504 
LEV 93  0.000 1.076 0.356 0.196 0.461 1.248 
SIZE 93  10.055 18.564 14.392 1.961 -0.014 -0.584 
 
 
Based on several bivariate measures (÷2; V-Cramer; Pearson’s Coefficient, etc.) between board 
characteristics, type of auditing firm, and independent variables, we found no significant 
association (p>0). The results provide preliminary evidence that board diversity and choice of 
auditing firm do not affect, at any statistically significant level, company profitability. This 
result does not corroborate most of the outcomes provided, namely in Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
Choi et al. (2007), Guest (2009), Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Rodriguez-Fernandez (2013), 
Shank et al. (2013), Klettner et al. (2014), Mishra and Mohanty (2014), Mouselli et al. (2014), 
and Bianco et al. (2015). However, the preliminary insights of the research do align with 
evidence provided by Black et al. (2006) and Carter et al. (2010). Thus, for Iberian firms, there 
is no significant relationship between profitability and board diversity. However, our results 
do align with the literature in relation to control variables. SIZE and LEV are statistically 
significant and observe the expected predictive signals. Based on Pearson’s correlation matrix 
(Table 3 below), we underline the negative association between some board characteristics: 
BDSIZE and BDEXEC (r=-0.208; p=0.045); BDWOM and BDAGE (r=-0.219; p=0.035); 
BDIND and BDEXT (r=-0.370; p=0.000); and BDIND and BDEXEC (r=-0.410; p=0.000.
  
Table 3 – Matrix of Person’s Coefficients 
VAR. PM ATUR ROE BDSIZE BDWOM BDIND BDNON -NAT BDAGE BDEXT BDEXEC AUD COUNT SIZE LEV 
PM 1              
ATUR -0.068 1  
      
     
0.518 
ROE 0.911
*** 0.101 1 0.000 0.337 
BDSIZE -0.023 -0.160 -0.026 1  
    
     
0.830 0.125 0.801 
BDWOM 0.064 -0.093 0.058 0.043 1 0.541 0.374 0.582 0.683 
BDIND 0.032 -0.015 0.048 -0.012 0.043 1         0.760 0.886 0.650 0.912 0.682 
BDNON 
-NAT 
0.054 -0.024 0.065 -0.027 0.012 0.017 1        0.606 0.820 0.533 0.800 0.906 0.869 
BDAGE 0.062 -0.063 0.056 0.116 -0.219
** 0.148 0.038 1       0.552 0.546 0.594 0.268 0.035 0.158 0.718 
BDEXT 
0.049 0.065 0.084 -0.078 0.153 -0.370*** 0.158 -0.077 
1 
     
0.639 0.536 0.423 0.456 0.143 0.000 0.130 0.463 
BDEXEC -0.003 0.044 0.000 -0.208
** -0.036 -0.410*** -0.127 -0.103 0.367*** 1     0.979 0.676 0.996 0.045 0.731 0.000 0.223 0.326 0.000 
AUD 0.034 0.063 0.008 0.127 0.009 0.117 0.004 0.261
** -0.205** -0.057 1    
0.745 0.548 0.940 0.225 0.931 0.262 0.973 0.012 0.049 0.591 
COUNT 0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.093 -0.142 -0.295
*** 0.034 -0.169 0.364*** 0.609*** -0.294*** 1   0.920 0.914 0.960 0.378 0.174 0.004 0.747 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.004 
SIZE 0.115 -0.246
** 0.118 0.672*** 0.140 0.275*** 0.211** 0.210** -0.213** .0.328*** -0.205** -0.294*** 1  0.271 0.017 0.262 0.000 0.181 0.008 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.001 0.049 0.004 
LEV -0.390
*** -0.342*** 0.528*** 0.135 0.047 -0.139 -0.098 -0.087 -0.045 0.042 -0.004 0.088 0.122 1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.198 0.652 0.184 0.351 0.408 0.667 0.692 0.967 0.402 0.245 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05
4.2. The regression model 
A hierarchical ordinary least square regression has been conducted to study the impact of 
independent variables on company profitability. As mentioned, several accounting-based 
measures have been considered as dependent variables (Profit Margin, ROE, and Asset 
Turnover), but only the model using Profit Margin and ROE could be globally validated. In 
relation to the dependent variable ATUR, the current research does not seem to fit well with 
the model, because when regressed with measures of board diversity and type of auditing firm 
contracted, the latter failed to explain any variance in performance (Adj. R2=0.099; F=1.817; 
p=0.067). Table 4, below, presents the results of the regression model conducted, which can 
only be applied to predict company Profit Margin and Return on Equity. In relation to ROE, 
we found an Adjusted R Square value of 27.4% (F=4.152; p=0.000), confirming that board 
characteristics and the type of auditing firm are not predictors of the likely profitability of 
Iberian firms. The results achieved by using PM as a dependent variable do align with previous 
evidence (Adj. R2=0.120; F=2.137; p=0.026). However, the evidence does not corroborate with 
the conclusions stated in other research, for example in Zahra and Pearce (1989), Choi et al. 
(2007), Guest (2009), Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Rodriguez-Fernandez (2013), Shank et 
al. (2013), Klettner et al. (2014), Mishra and Mohanty (2014), Mouselli et al. (2014), and 
Bianco et al. (2015). These insights can probably be explained by cultural differences 
(Hofstede et al. 2010) and scale effects between both countries under analysis.  
  
Table 4 – Regression Model Equations (PM and ROE) 
 ROE   PM    
 β t Sig. VIF β t Sig. VIF 
Intercept -0.146 -0.872 0.386  -0.327 -0.911 0.365  
BDSIZE -0.007 -1.778 0.079* 2.277 -0.013 -1.616 0.110 2.277 
BDWOM 0.047 0.468 0.641 1.212 0.134 0.622 0.536 1.212 
BDIND -0.062 -1.004 0.318 1.508 -0.129 -0.980 0.330 1.508 
BDNON-
NAT 
-0.052 -1.095 0.277 1.288 -0.091 -0.886 0.378 1.288 
BDAGE -0.001 -0.081 0.936 1.225 0.001 0.158 0.875 1.225 
BDEXT 0.047 0.666 0.507 1.484 0.039 0.262 0.794 1.484 
BDEXEC -0.032 -0.148 0.696 2.091 -0.093 -0.527 0.599 2.091 
AUD -0.004 -0.392 0.889 1.240 0.026 0.400 0.690 1.240 
COUNT 0.031 0.141 0.287 2.055 0.074 1.217 0.227 2.055 
LEV -0.326 -6.251 0.000*** 1.105 -0.482 -4.314 0.000*** 1.105 
SIZE 0.024 2.924 0.004*** 2.784 0.043 2.408 0.018** 2.784 
   R2= 0.361  R2= 0.225  
   Adj. R2 = 0.274  Adj. R2 = 0.120  
   F= 4.152  F= 2.137  
   Sig. 0.000***  Sig. 0.026**  
   DW 1.965  DW 2.016  
 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
 
Broadly, board diversity and the type of auditing firm contracted do not influence the 
profitability indicators of non-financial Iberian companies (although a statistical global 
adherence of both models, p value of all variables is above the accepted level, except for control 
variables (leverage and size). 
 
BDSIZE is negatively statistically correlated with ROE, however, at a 10% significance (r=-
0.007; p=0,079). This evidence aligns with Jensen (1993), however, obtained at a low 
significance level. In relation to the participation of women on boards, there is no evidence to 
support the hypothesis that the relation between the proportion of women (BDWOM) on the 
board, and company profitability, is statistically significant (ROE: t=0.408; p=0.684; PM: 
r=0,622; p=0.536). These results suggest a positive impact (ROE: r=0,047; PM: r=0.134), 
which corroborates the economic signals evidenced in Eagly et al. (1995), Erhardt et al. (2003), 
and Boulouta (2013). The positive impact supports the idea that women embody qualities as 
stated (empathy, affection, and promotion of community values) and that this has a positive 
impact on company profitability and performance. Other insights that corroborate with this 
positive effect can be found in Francoeur et al. (2008) and in Adams and Ferreira (2009). These 
authors emphasize that the higher proportion of women on boards boosts company 
profitability. Broadly, our results are consistent with those of Carter et al. (2003) and Adams 
et al. (2009), who reported inconclusive or not even statistically significant results. 
 
In the current research, we have also put forward the hypothesis that company profitability is 
affected by the type of auditing firm the company selects for  certification of the accounts. This 
assumption is not supported by our theoretical model, however, which evidences a mixed effect 
that is not statistically significant: AUD is negatively correlated with ROE (r=-0.004; t= -0.392; 
p=0,889) and positively correlated with PM (r=0.026; t=0.400; p=0,690). Contrary to the 
results achieved by Lee and Lee (2013), showing equity book value and earnings audited by 
the Big 4 firms justify the variations in stock returns more than those by other auditing firms, 
the results of the current research appear to be inconclusive. 
 
Focusing on the participation of foreign board members, this research has found that greater 
participation of non-national directors negatively correlates with profitability (ROE: r=-0.052; 
p=0.277; PM: r=-0.091; p=0.378). This evidence does not corroborate the study of Choi et al. 
(2007), based on the Korean market, which confirmed that diversity of nationality on boards 
positively affects profitability and performance. However, these findings do align with one 
piece of research carried out among Swiss companies, where there is evidence that a greater 
national diversity on boards can create conflict and affect the decision-making process, hence 
negatively affecting profitability (Ruigrok et al. 2007). 
 
With regard to interlocking directorates, the current study has tested whether the expertise of 
outside directors to the board positively affects profitability. This assumption is partially 
confirmed, because the relationship between outside directors (BDEXT), ROE, and PM is 
positive, although not statistically significant (ROE: r=0.047; t=0.666; p=0.507/PM: r=0.039; 
t=0.262;p=0.794). These results do not confirm the findings of Dahya and McConnell (2007) 
and Brickley and James (1987), both of which point out that a relevant number of external 
directors tends to increase profitability overall. Nonetheless, much of the other research in this 
area reports similar inconclusive results concerning the link between company profitability and 
the ratio of external directors (Mehran 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Bhagat and Black 
2008). Surprisingly, the number of executive members is negatively correlated with 
profitability, although not statistically significant (ROE: r=-0.032; t=-0.148; p=0.696/PM: r=-
0.093; t=-0.527;p=0.599). As expected, the control variables (SIZE and LEV) are statistically 
significant in both models. 
 
With respect to the robustness of the models, we ran the multicollinearity diagnosis, the 
residual analysis, and the heteroscedasticity tests. We found that none of the independent 
variables of the current research has a VIF value close to 10, concluding that the analysis does 
not observe a severe problem of multicollinearity. In analysis of the independence of residuals, 
we used the Durbin-Watson (DW) test. Based on these statistics, we noted that a null hypothesis 
is not rejected, meaning that residuals describe a normal distribution, and confirming that those 
errors are not auto-correlated. In relation to heteroscedasticity, we used the White Test in not 
rejecting the null hypothesis (p>0.05). Thus, the evidence provided by the current econometric 
model can serve as an important contribution to both theory and practice. 
 
4.3. Comparison between Portugal and Spain 
The current study has analysed the differences between Portugal and Spain in terms of whether 
the distribution of variances and means of the dependent and independent variables are the 
same for companies in both Iberian countries. As shown in Table 5, below, two tests were 
performed, Levene’s Test for equality of variances and the T-Test for equality of means. In 
this analysis, the null hypothesis states that the variance and the mean of the variables are 
equally distributed across both countries.  
  
Table 5 – Comparison between Iberian countries 
Variable 
Equality 
of 
Variances 
(F) 
Sig. 
Equality 
of Means 
(t) 
df Sig. Mean Dif. Null Hypothesis 
ROEit 2.473 0.119 0.050 91 0.960 0.00118 Not Rejected 
PMit 1.712 0.194 -0.100 91 0.920 -0.00458 Not Rejected 
ATURit 0.007 0.935 0.109 91 0.914 0.01065 Not Rejected 
BDSIZEit 0.742 0.391 0.886 91 0.378 0.74630 Not Rejected 
BDWOMit 1.286 0.260 1.370 91 0.174 0.03088 Not Rejected 
BDINDit 0.090 0.765 2.950 91 0.004 0.11723 Rejected*** 
BDNON-
NATit 0.436 0.511 -0.324 91 0.747 -0.01603 Not Rejected 
BDAGEit 0.001 0.982 1.639 91 0.105 1.43540 Not Rejected 
BDEXTit 4.291 0.041 -3.730 91 0.000 -0.12535 Rejected*** 
BDEXECit 3.105 0.081 -7.329 91 0.000 -0.21237 Rejected*** 
AUDit 38.103 0.000 2.930 91 0.004 0.21700 Rejected*** 
SIZEit 0.472 0.494 2.931 91 0.004 1.18291 Rejected*** 
LEVit 0.214 0.645 -0.842 91 0.402 -0.03529 Not Rejected 
 
***p<0.01 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected only for BDIND, BDEXT, BDEXEC, AUD, and SIZE, to show 
that board characteristics differ across the two countries. The explanation behind these 
differences could be supported by the different corporate governance frameworks that apply in 
Portugal and Spain, as well as by cultural differences (Hofstede et al. 2010). As mentioned 
above in the theoretical framework, despite the convergence between Portugal and Spain in 
relation to avoidance of uncertainty and power distance in terms of individualism, masculinity, 
long-term orientation, and indulgence, there are real differences between the countries. That 
these four dimensions are stronger in Spain than in Portugal is probably a reflection of the scale 
effects, which is also supported by the control variable SIZE. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for BDSIZE, BDWOM, BDNON-NAT, BDAGE, and LEV, meaning that 
these board characteristics are similar between the two countries. This might be explained by 
the cultural similarities between the countries, but also by the fact that companies in both 
countries are obliged to comply with rules similar to those of the financial markets that are 
regulated by European laws and procedures. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Final Remarks 
The efficacy of corporate governance frameworks has received substantial attention by 
researchers, academics, and governmental institutions. Companies should comply with 
corporate governance frameworks, as these introduce a set of internal and external mechanisms 
that can affect the overall profitability of the company either positively or negatively depending 
on how they are implemented. 
 
The current research analyses the relationship between board characteristics and profitability 
of the company, measured by the Profit Margin (PM) and Return on Equity (ROE) of 93 non-
financial companies listed on the Portuguese and Spanish stock exchanges. Other profitability 
measures have been used, including ROA (Return on Assets), ROS (Return on Sales), Asset 
Turnover, Net Income, and Earnings Per Share (Weygandt et al. 2012). Taking a broad view, 
board characteristics, and choice of auditing firm are not reliable predictors of the profitability 
of Iberian firms, as the research did not provide significant results according to the level of 
variance explained (Adj. R-Square) and F-Test (p>0.1). The mixed results provided by the 
literature concerning statistical significant impacts and signals, induce us to report inconclusive 
results; however, the results obtained can be plausibly explained by both cultural and scale 
differences between the countries under analysis. When comparing Portugal and Spain, 
significant differences were found relating to the proportion of independent members, external 
members, and executive members on the board. These differences can be supported by scale 
effects, and can be measured through the control variable “firm size”. We underline, like other 
researchers, some practical limitations that could be addressed in the future: first, the current 
research has focused on Iberian-listed non-financial companies; second, the data used for 
analysis covers a single year, despite the stable variance in board characteristics and auditing 
firms over time. Therefore, we suggest that future research extends the timeline, the range of 
companies, and the number of countries, and employs other profitability measures and applies 
other statistical models, in order to achieve a more comprehensive view of the corporate 
governance phenomenon. By a process of elimination such as the current research provides a 
snap shot of both the stable and emerging nature of the phenomenon is achieved. This research 
helps verify which elements of corporate governance have a direct effect on company 
profitability and sustainability, which when tracked, may yield statistically relevant results in 
the future.  
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